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MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGY, by Mira T. Sundara Rajan. Oxford University Press, 
2011. 572 pp. Paperback $150 
 
Reviewed by Cyrill P. Rigamonti, University of Bern, Faculty of Law. 
TTcyrill.rigamonti@iwr.unibe.ch 
 
The stated purpose of Sundara Rajan’s book on moral rights is twofold, 
namely to establish what is meant by moral rights as a global phenomenon 
and to examine moral rights issues in view of new technological 
developments.  She states right up front that she approaches the subject with 
a clear goal, which is “to make a case for moral rights as an essential 
weapon in the fight to preserve human creativity in the Digital Age” (p.29).  
The text is well written and easy to read, perhaps because it is more a 
collection of interesting vignettes rather than a pedantic scholarly narrative.  
However, despite the word “practice” in the title, practitioners should not 
expect the book to be a comprehensive reference, as the cases selected do 
not necessarily reflect the entire body of case law on the subject. 
 
In terms of structure, the book is divided into ten self-contained chapters, 
which is advantageous for readers who want to pick and choose just one or 
two chapters.  The first chapter (pp.1-30) provides an introduction to the 
basic notions of moral rights law and explains why moral rights are ever 
more relevant in the digital age, but it does not really explain in what sense 
moral rights differ from economic rights when it comes to the challenges of 
the digital environment, especially as far as enforcement issues are 
concerned.  Similarly, the second half of the book, which is meant to 
address the current and future development of moral rights in view of 
technological change, dedicates almost as much space to regular copyright 
law as it does to moral rights. 
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The second chapter (pp.31-113) essentially outlines the law of moral rights 
in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and gives some background 
on the historical development of the doctrine.  Sundara Rajan begins each 
country description with brief discussions of the very early stages of the 
doctrine’s development, but then rather abruptly jumps to overviews of 
current moral rights law in these countries, basically leaving gaps of up to 
200 years in the case of France and the United Kingdom.  In addition, the 
legal overviews are at times rather cursory and suffer from the fact that they 
focus heavily on statutory rules, thereby disregarding to a large extent the 
sometimes rich and complex case law, even though it is critically important 
for a proper understanding of delicate issues such as waivers.  In the section 
on the United Kingdom, Sundara Rajan claims that moral rights were 
recognized in the 1769 landmark case of Millar v. Taylor and then rejected 
for good in 1775 in Donaldson v. Beckett.  Although it is true that the non-
pecuniary interests that later became the justification for moral rights were, 
in retrospect, neatly outlined by Lord Mansfield in Millar,1 he neither had a 
clear theory of moral rights in the modern sense nor did the facts of these 
cases involve a moral rights scenario.  Both Millar and Donaldson were 
about common law copyright protection in the context of what today would 
be a straightforward copyright infringement case.  Saying that Millar 
recognized moral rights is as much an exaggeration as saying that 
Donaldson rejected moral rights.  Sundara Rajan seems to acknowledge this 
herself in the fourth chapter, explaining that Donaldson was “essentially a 
response, not to the moral rights idea, but to a different type of claim” 
(p.241), but this statement should have been included in the discussion of 
these cases in the second chapter in order to avoid misunderstandings. 
 
The third chapter (pp.115-225) continues to provide overviews of different 
moral rights regimes, in particular those of the United States, Australia, 
Canada, India, Japan, and Russia.  This is perhaps where Sundara Rajan 
makes her most valuable contribution to the study of moral rights by going 
beyond the often discussed jurisdictions of Western Europe and the United 
States.  Indeed, one of the best segments of the book is the subchapter on 
India (pp.163-81), precisely because the author provides quite a bit more 
background and detail than she does about other countries.  The pages 
describing the many transformations of Russian moral rights law are also 
illuminating (pp.188-222). 
 
In the fourth chapter (pp.227-81), Sundara Rajan reviews the status of moral 
rights in the most important international copyright treaties, in particular the 
Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.  Occasionally, it would 
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have been helpful if some of the claims had been better supported by 
evidence, for example the claim that 19th century authors such as Victor 
Hugo “certainly recognized the idea of moral rights and were familiar with 
its significance as a legal concept in French and Continental law” (p.243), 
or that the presence of moral rights in the 1928 Berne Convention “was 
clearly a product of their efforts” (p.243), which is not at all that clear.2  
Moreover, the statement that the WIPO Copyright Treaty “makes no 
reference whatsoever to moral rights” (p.259) is difficult to understand 
given the explicit reference in Article 1(4) to the Berne Convention, which 
obviously includes a moral rights provision in Article 6bis.  Perhaps the 
most interesting topic of this chapter is the question of why moral rights for 
performers were included in the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, the answer to which is not self-evident given the traditionally hostile 
attitude of the United States, its primary driver, towards moral rights 
generally.  Unfortunately, the book does not go beyond suggesting that an 
extra layer of rights might benefit the music industry indirectly (pp.267-68).  
Sundara Rajan concludes the chapter with a call for further international 
harmonization in order to adapt moral rights to technological change, but 
she wisely warns that an international legislative framework will not be 
enough and that “the solutions will need to address long-term problems, 
deeply ingrained legal biases, and deep-seated cultural prejudices” (p.280). 
 
The fifth chapter (pp.283-319) marks the beginning of the second part of the 
book, which is dedicated to moral rights in the digital context.  In particular, 
Sundara Rajan discusses moral rights as they apply to computer programs 
as “literary works” and reviews different national approaches that tend to be 
somewhat restrictive even in countries in which moral rights are generally 
accepted.  She concludes that “the legal imperative to treat computer 
programs as literary works may be mistaken” (p.297) and recommends the 
exemption of functional uses from moral rights protection by limiting moral 
rights to the protection of honor and reputation.  In addition, she argues in 
favor of exceptions to allow for the development of new features or 
programs, without, however, giving concrete details on how such an 
exemption would have to be crafted.  Sundara Rajan also reiterates the 
importance of applying moral rights in the corporate context on the basis of 
a human rights argument and with the goal of establishing “a more humane 
environment in the software industry” (p.301).  This line of thought is a 
distinctive feature of the book, even though there is no apparent reason to 
recast moral rights protection in human rights language in order to make the 
case for applying moral rights in a corporate context.  A purely utilitarian 
rationale invoking the importance of attribution as an economic value would 
probably be more effective in practice.  The motion picture and videogame 
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industries are good examples of how complex attribution systems can 
develop even in the absence of statutory moral rights protection as an 
important element of doing business, selecting talent, and building careers. 
 
The sixth chapter (pp.321-73) addresses moral rights and digital issues in 
music, again on the basis of an understanding of moral rights as “human 
rights of authors and artists” (p.327).  By contrast, however, the chapter’s 
primary focus is on economic rights in the context of sampling, mixing, file-
sharing, legal downloading, and the global licensing of music through ISPs.  
From the point of view of moral rights, the most interesting segments in this 
chapter relate to whether splitting albums, format shifting, and the use of 
music to create ringtones violate moral rights, the latter of which is explored 
through the lens of a pioneering decision by the German Supreme Court.  
As part of her recommendations, Sundara Rajan reiterates that moral rights 
should also be protected in the digital context but cautions that they should 
be “subject to certain modifications which are appropriate to this 
environment” (p.371).  In her view, this means that the right of attribution 
should be “exercised with technological necessity in mind” and that the 
right of integrity should be “restricted to situations of damage to reputation” 
(p.371).  The latter is, of course, exactly what the minimum standard of the 
Berne Convention is all about. 
 
Moral rights in film are the subject matter of the seventh chapter (pp.375-
435).  The fact that motion pictures cannot be created without the 
collaboration of a large number of people has always been a challenge for 
copyright law.  This is no different for moral rights.  Accordingly, the focus 
of this chapter is placed on the definition of authorship in moral rights law, 
which is indeed an important topic given that the exercise of these rights 
depends on establishing authorship.  Sundara Rajan’s review of the laws of 
various countries shows that there are vastly different approaches to 
authorship across the globe.  A large portion of this chapter is dedicated to 
India, which is particularly useful, because it brings lesser-known, yet very 
interesting cases to the attention of a broader audience.  As part of her 
recommendations, she concludes that the moral rights of disclosure, 
attribution, and integrity are “appropriate for film”, but “should be tailored 
to the practical requirements of the medium” (p.433).  Sundara Rajan also 
observes that moral rights have not chilled the film industry in those 
countries that do have them, and that the defensive position of the United 
States is “quite anomalous” in this respect (p.434), potentially generating 
“national embarrassment” if “Hollywood’s neglect of moral rights translates 
into American disregard for America’s own filmmakers” who receive better 
protection abroad than at home (p.434).  Consequently, she concludes this 
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chapter with a call for the United States not to be left behind, as there is 
“little need for the American film industry to be fearful” (p.435). 
 
The eighth chapter (pp.437-85) returns to more standard turf by addressing 
moral rights in the visual arts.  Sundara Rajan aptly notes that, in this area, 
moral rights attract ready sympathy, receive stronger protection than other 
kinds of works, and are recognized even where the general recognition of 
moral rights is in doubt, such as in the United States.  She also observes that 
“moral rights of visual artists often turn upon a special approach to the 
interpretation of the moral right of integrity in the visual context” (p.439), 
which is indeed the case, given that some countries tend to extend the right 
of integrity into the realm of preservation of cultural heritage, thereby 
extending the traditionally individualist approach to moral rights into the 
social sphere.  In this context, the book briefly discusses the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 and the special provisions regarding the visual arts in 
Canadian moral rights law, and further includes short reviews of illustrative 
international cases, such as the Calatrava case in Spain.  A recurring theme 
in this and previous chapters is the author’s culturally sensitive critique of 
copyright law and Western moral rights regimes as being based upon a 
romantic notion of authorship that is exaggerated and often inadequate to 
deal with the needs for attribution and integrity of Aboriginal communities.  
Accordingly, in the context of the Australian Yumbulul case, Sundara Rajan 
explores the idea of an “Aboriginal moral right that would be vested in the 
community concerned” and that may also be a “possible solution to the 
dangers of cultural appropriation” (p.454), but she also openly 
acknowledges the difficulties in applying such a right in practice.  A large 
part of this chapter is devoted to conceptualizing moral rights as a bridge 
between intellectual property rights and the protection of cultural heritage, 
using Indian moral rights cases as a conduit for discussion. 
 
The ninth chapter (pp.487-532) addresses moral rights in the context of 
what Sundara Rajan calls “open access”.  It includes an analysis of creative 
commons licenses, which put a premium on attribution and integrity, but, 
contrary to what the book claims, do not provide an “alternative to 
copyright protection” (p.497).  The entire idea of creative commons is to 
work within the copyright system and use it to enforce its licensing terms 
when necessary, even if the standard terms of creative commons licenses 
happen to be more permissive than others.  Sundara Rajan also criticizes the 
creative commons approach of enabling free access while retaining a certain 
level of authorial control by arguing that authors cannot make a living 
giving away their works for free.  The latter may be true in the abstract, but 
the argument overlooks that the creative commons movement does not force 
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anybody to make his or her work available for free.  It simply provides 
licensing options for those who want to disseminate their works without 
being paid while providing users with legal certainty about the terms of the 
applicable copyright license.  In the balance, this passage creates a 
surprising contrast in attitude to the first 500 pages of the book, which are 
almost exclusively concerned with the non-economic interests of authors on 
the basis of moral rights understood as human rights.  Following a few 
words about the theoretical relevance of moral rights in the context of the 
free software movement and large-scale collaborative undertakings of the 
Wikipedia type, Sundara Rajan turns to the Google Book project.  This is an 
unusual choice for a book on moral rights, given that moral rights are the 
least of Google’s copyright problems, with the exception perhaps of the 
question of whether displaying “snippets” of texts violates the author’s 
moral right of integrity.  Unfortunately, however, this issue is not explored 
in depth.  Analytically, the claim that the moral right of disclosure is 
implicated if a book is included in Google’s archives (p.524) is also strange, 
because this right is typically understood to be limited to the first disclosure, 
and such disclosure must have happened long before Google incorporated 
the book in its digital archive. 
 
In the tenth chapter (pp.533-35), Sundara Rajan concludes the book with 
two messages that are keyed to her two stated purposes of defining moral 
rights and exploring their application in the digital environment.  First, she 
finds that moral rights are a “robust doctrine” that is “widely accepted in 
countries representing diverse traditions” and that consists of increasingly 
different approaches also throughout common law countries (p.533).  
Second, she maintains that moral rights are ever more needed in the digital 
environment, because they “protect knowledge” and “turn social attention to 
the human side of culture” (p.535). 
 
The book is definitely an interesting read.  Those who are not familiar with 
moral rights or copyright law may want to read it as a whole, as a collection 
of stimulating issues, not just regarding moral rights, but also regarding 
economic rights.  Scholars in the field who are already well-read on the 
doctrine of moral rights and its history can still benefit by focusing on 
Sundara Rajan’s overview of moral rights regimes that are not as well 
known in the Western hemisphere, in particular the previously under-
explored countries of Russia and India. 
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1  See also Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 353, 381-82 (2006). 
2  For a different account on why moral rights were inserted into the Berne 
Convention during the 1928 revision conference, see Cyrill P. 
Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 67, 111-119 (2007). 
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CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS, 
GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN INNOVATION, by Eric L. Lane. 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 276 pp. Paperback $185 
Reviewed by Joshua D. Sarnoff, De Paul University College of Law. 
jsarnoff@depaul.edu 
Eric Lane seeks to explain the title of his book, CLEAN TECH 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS, 
AND GREEN INNOVATION, by justifying the categories of clean tech 
and clean tech intellectual property (IP).  But experts sum it up, they define 
clean tech by its goals and intentions, i.e., what it does instead of what it is: 
[C]lean tech is marked by its diversity but unified by its purpose.  That 
purpose, of course, is to benefit the environment and mitigate climate 
change by “generating energy through renewable sources, boosting energy 
efficiency, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (p.1). 
Given this broad set of goals for clean tech, and the broader set of 
technologies and practices that can promote or hinder those goals, Lane 
addresses a similarly broad set of IP topics, which he collectively labels 
“eco-marks”, “green patents”, and “green IP” (p.1).  Green IP is 
“characterized by clean tech’s unique features, which tend to make certain 
issues more prevalent in clean tech IP than in IP focused on other 
industries” (p.2).  The specific issues that Lane addresses are:  (1) patent 
prosecution, portfolios and licensing; (2) clean tech patent litigation 
(including assertions by non-practicing entities, who are sometimes 
pejoratively referred to―but not by Lane―as patent “trolls”); (3) green 
branding, greenwashing, and enforcement of eco-marks; and (4) policies, 
initiatives, and debates over how best to promote development (and 
patenting) of clean tech (pp.ix-xii).  Of course, these are only a few of the 
topics that Lane could have addressed, which include but are not limited to: 
(5) different approaches to promoting innovation, from reliance on private 
enterprise and markets (and competition regulation) to government 
procurement to university-based development to commons-based 
approaches; (6) IP and international trade law concerns; (7) copyrights and 
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digital rights (including interoperability concerns, anti-circumvention 
measures, and limits on reverse engineering); (8) data protection and access; 
and (9) information privacy (particularly with regard to smart grid and other 
innovative technologies).1 
Fortunately, and notwithstanding the typical promotional over-reaching (the 
front inside cover calls the book the “first comprehensive review of 
intellectual property and clean technology”), all clean tech IP is not Lane’s 
focus.  Rather, and much more manageably, Lane focuses on the issues of 
greatest importance to his self-proclaimed specialty (and thus to his 
clientele, and to others who are similarly situated), i.e., “helping technology 
companies build, grow, and manage their patent and trademark portfolios, 
with a particular focus on renewable energy and other areas of clean 
technology” (“About the Author”).  Lane thus bases his book on personal 
experience and additional information gained from interviews with 
technology developers (“Acknowledgements”).  Consequently, the book’s 
scope is manageable, its focus is practical, its knowledge-base is real, and it 
is well-documented with concrete examples.  Although the book is partially 
adapted from law review articles typically read by academics 
(“Acknowledgements”), the book’s audience appears to be principally 
business people who need an exposure to these legal issues and thus may 
become more interested in pursuing green tech IP, the general public, and 
non-IP lawyers who may not have encountered the area. IP lawyers and IP 
academics may still be interested in reading about the topics with which 
they are not already familiar with or assigning the book to students.  As an 
introduction to the issues, it does a terrific job.  As an explanation of how to 
actually make the required business and legal decisions it may be seriously 
lacking. 
As Lane himself notes “[o]ne of the themes this book explores is the 
importance of green patents to small clean tech innovators, entrepreneurs, 
and startups” (p.4).  Lane’s theme makes eminent sense, the book fulfills 
the promise of this theme more than adequately.  Recent survey evidence 
has demonstrated that entrepreneurs―particularly venture-financed startups 
―may rely more on patents than do other inventors, businesses, and related 
institutions: 
While venture-backed startup executives rate the incentive value [of 
patents] more highly than do those at [Dunn & Bradstreet-sampled] 
companies, in no category are patents reported to provide even a 
“moderate” incentive for any of the four entrepreneurial activities 
about which we queried.2 
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Given what may be irrational assumptions and requirements of venture 
capitalists, there will continue to be a need (and probably an increasing 
need) for the patenting, licensing, and litigation strategies that Lane 
discusses.  Given the existing and anticipated expansion of clean 
technologies and services and of the businesses that will supply them, the 
same is true for the importance of developing and regulating eco-marks, 
certification marks, and other branding strategies.   
Before getting to the meat of those discussions, it bears noting that although 
Lane’s initial focus on terminology may seem somewhat defensive for a 
book published in 2011, when clean tech and intellectual property measures 
relating to them are actually well established, his purpose in doing so is 
highly salutary.  Many (particularly the business and general public 
audience that his book appears directed at) may not understand what these 
categories cover.  Further, because Lane’s basic premise is that clean tech 
IP is different from other IP areas, definition is critical.  Lane apparently 
believes clean tech IP is different because of three central features:  (1) the 
diversity of technologies; (2) its reliance on R&D developed from prior 
green technology research and computers and semiconductors; and, 
particularly, (3) its “moral underpinning as a vehicle for the greater good” 
(pp.2-3).  Given this premise, Lane argues that “green IP issues pose unique 
challenges and raise profound legal and moral questions about the nature of 
innovation, the best way to facilitate transfer and deployment of clean 
technologies, and how to protect green consumers” (p.3). 
At one level, I doubt the validity of Lane’s premise regarding the difference 
of clean tech IP from other IP as it is stated.  Although clean tech IP does 
address a wide variety of technologies and relies on prior R&D, many 
complex and complementary fields of technology in history have been 
charged with social development and other moral premises, particularly 
development of medicines and other treatments for neglected diseases.  
However, I ultimately agree with Lane that the magnitude of the current 
technology needs and nature of the climate concerns add a unique layer of 
moral imperative to the category of “clean tech” that may not have existed 
with the development of many earlier technologies, such as steam engines, 
railroads, computers, or biotechnology.  Given that moral imperative, the 
book not only is timely but also is very much welcome as a practical guide 
to developing and managing the technologies that are needed.  This is 
particularly important in light of the debatable choice made in the context of 
international climate change negotiations to rely on the patent system and 
private markets to develop and disseminate the needed mitigation and 
adaptation technologies.3  And if the book also helps to promote his legal 
practice, Lane will have earned it. 
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As Lane notes, “many of today’s green tech inventions are derivative and 
incremental improvements upon prior developments in clean tech or borrow 
from other industries” (p.15), which raises questions about their 
patentability under traditional criteria of novelty (including inherency) and 
non-obviousness, which Lane briefly reviews (pp.15-20).  This assumption 
of incremental innovation is important to beliefs that the patent system is 
well suited to assuring access to climate change technologies.  For 
incremental innovations, existing non-patented technologies may be 
substitutes that impose price constraints.  In contrast, for breakthrough 
technologies, such as a major development in carbon capture from coal-
fired electric utilities, worldwide pressures to override patent rights will 
likely arise for measures such as outright exclusion from patentable subject 
matter, compulsory licensing, or competition law-based remedies.4  Lane 
then describes numerous patent drafting strategies to match the doctrinal 
concerns, providing a concrete example of silent, swift wind turbine 
technology (pp.20-29).  These strategies, of course, are also technology and 
business development strategies, as a “creative patent attorney will work 
with inventors to tease out” whatever may be patentable (p.21) and thus 
whatever may be worth patenting because it presents a useful product or 
process that a patent owner would seek to license. 
Similarly, Lane describes the development of patent portfolios for wind-
turbine and municipal waste, biomass, or coal gasification technologies 
(pp.30-57), noting that the size and components of a successful portfolio 
will depend on the innovation space and on capturing the “key innovations 
that support a company’s business strategy, which often are those that 
differentiate the company from its competitors” (p.57).  While no doubt 
accurate at this level of generality, Lane both highlights the importance of 
those features and fails to supply useful guidance for how business people 
or lawyers can effectively identify those features for themselves.  However, 
it would be unfair to expect this from a book pitched for general interest, 
and even a treatise may not be sufficient to convey the practical knowledge 
required to make such judgments.  But it emphasizes that the book is (and 
perhaps only could be) a basic introduction to the subject. 
To conclude this section of his book, Lane discusses the important topic of 
technology transfer and licensing.  He focuses on intellectual property 
licensing as both an out-licensing strategy that can overcome barriers to 
entry in product markets, create business efficiencies, and allow rapid 
scaling up of production and market access (or facilitate joint marketing 
arrangements), or that may avoid production entirely by becoming a non-
practicing entity licensor in all or only in secondary markets (pp.59-67, 70-
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80).  Lane also discusses an in-licensing strategy (pp.68-70) that can avoid 
the need “to develop products from scratch” (p.58).   
As Lane notes, because of the high costs of patent litigation, clean tech 
court disputes involve multiple technologies (from wind power to efficient 
light emitting diodes, LEDs, to Toyota Prius hybrids) that have been scaled, 
are widely commercialized, and are profitable (pp.83-85).  He provides 
detailed descriptions of three such disputes (involving wind, LEDs, and 
biofuels), and notes some of the differences between litigating in federal 
district court and in the International Trade Commission, the strategic use of 
reexamination, and the frequent goal of litigating to promote licensing 
rather than to protect market share (which is sometimes done even though it 
may not make economic sense given the high costs of litigation) (pp.86-
115).  Lane then turns to litigation by non-practicing entities (NPEs), this 
time noting limits on injunctive relief (and consequent resort again to the 
ITC) and provision of ongoing royalties (which effectively impose a 
compulsory patent license at the royalty amounts set by the judge), and 
notes the development of patent licensing companies that bring suit as 
NPEs, by inventors of important patents to new technology sectors―such 
as the smart grid (pp.116-146). 
In concluding this section, Lane extrapolates from these discussions to 
predict future patent litigation in the clean-tech area.  Unsurprisingly, he 
focuses on wind power, LEDs, and hybrid electric (and plug-in and fully 
electric) vehicles.  He also notes, based on market penetration, that solar 
thermal (solar cell and solar photovoltaic (PV)) technologies are likely to be 
litigated, as may additional biofuels technologies (e.g., cellulosic ethanol 
from sources that do not compete with food supplies) (pp.147-150).  
Although Lane’s predictions are no doubt likely to be correct, they are also 
obvious.  They are also limited to the areas that he focuses on; many other 
climate-related or otherwise green technologies will achieve scalable results 
and market sizes and profits that will make patent litigation attractive to 
existing and entering market participants and NPEs.  Thus, other than very 
well written and documented anecdotes about patent litigation in the sectors 
described, which may help to educate an audience that does not already 
know much about patent litigation, it is not clear what value these 
discussions bring. 
Lane opens this section of the book by proclaiming that, “[i]ndeed, we stand 
at the dawn of the Eco-mark Era―a period in which green branding, 
advertising environmentally friendly products and services, and touting 
sustainable business practices will be pervasive and profitable” (p.151).  I 
wholeheartedly agree with this conclusion, but again (at least to me) it 
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seems obvious.  Lane then suggests what may be the value of this 
section―a discussion not of whether firms will (with increasing frequency) 
highlight their eco-friendly practices but “how they will do so” (p.151).  
Accordingly, the first chapter of this section discusses protection of eco-
marks, the legal problem of descriptiveness as a barrier to registration, and 
strategies for overcoming that problem.  Lane follows with a discussion of 
“greenwashing,” which he defines as “making false or misleading claims 
regarding purportedly environmentally friendly products, services, or 
practices,” and then concludes the section with a discussion of protection 
and enforcement of eco-marks, focusing on litigation and its effects on 
consumers (p.152). 
Notably missing from his summary—although not from his actual 
discussion, which notes in the discussion of green mark registration the 
example of certification by the US Green Building Council, (p.156) and 
discusses certification marks explicitly as a good strategy:  “[i]f a firm’s 
core business is affected by green characteristics” (p.162)―is the use of 
certification marks that identify not the source or origin of goods or services 
but their purported compliance with certification standards that may help 
the public to identify eco-friendly goods and services (pp.153-67).  Unlike 
for the earlier patent sections, Lane uses his examples in this section to offer 
some concrete advice regarding branding strategies to avoid descriptiveness 
rejections (i.e., adding non-descriptive or arbitrary elements to the mark, 
disclaiming green terminology and separate use, as required by the 
registering authority, combining incongruous but related elements, avoiding 
eco-references in descriptions of goods and services, and (if all else fails) 
relying on acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning) or registering on 
the Supplemental Register until acquired distinctiveness can be shown 
(pp.156-62). 
When discussing greenwashing, Lane delicately notes the market incentives 
for brand owners to be “tempted to make lazy, unsubstantiated green claims 
[or even] worse, [for] some businesses [to] try to deceive green-leaning 
consumers or engage in other forms of eco-mark abuse. . .” (p.168).  Since 
greenwashing, false environmental claims, and inadequate (or inadequate 
policing of compliance with) certification standards apparently are an 
endemic and growing problem, Lane himself notes this “disturbing trend,” 
citing to a study conducted by a marketing organization,5 which found all 
but one of over 1000 self-declared green products to have “displayed some 
form of greenwash by committing at least one of the [seven] sins” of 
greenwashing:  (1) hidden harmful trade-offs associated with the 
environmental benefits claimed; (2) lack of proof or substantiation; (3) 
vague or otherwise unintelligible claims; (4) false labeling (to provide the 
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impression of a third-party environmental endorsement); (5) 
environmentally irrelevant claims; (6) the lesser of two evils (when the 
claim is comparatively true but the overall impact of the product is 
harmful); and (7) outright fibbing (pp.168-171).  In response to perceived 
widespread greenwashing, public and private responses have emerged 
(pp.171-73), including the Federal Trade Commission’s guidelines for 
environmental marketing claims,6 and various websites that rate the claims 
and overall environmental records of particular companies.7  Of perhaps 
greater interest, Lane notes actions taken by a public certifying entity (the 
Department of Energy for the “EnergyStar” program) and by private 
individuals to seek to impose liability and corrective actions on companies 
falsely obtaining certifications or making false (or at least deceptive) claims 
—although he also notes the uncertain ability to successfully litigate such 
cases and the questionable effectiveness of settlements that so far have been 
achieved, achieving “mixed results” (pp.176-185).  This is perhaps the 
strongest of Lane’s chapters, as its descriptions highlight the tawdry reality 
and the undeveloped state of the law, although it still leaves the reader 
wondering how to effectively navigate the field (e.g., describing what will 
meet the FTC marketing requirements, much less how to effectively 
avoid―or, for those less morally inclined, skate close to without 
committing―the seven sins).  The reader is left with the impression (which 
I believe is correct) that law reform is badly needed to make private 
litigation more effective, to encourage public action to more aggressively 
police greenwashing (which Lane recommends, p.199), and to adopt laws 
that will more effectively deter such conduct in the first instance.  
This leads Lane to the chapter on enforcement of eco-marks themselves.  
Here, even when describing standard trademark litigation, Lane fails to 
provide the general reader with the basic standards (typically, an eight-
factor balancing test) for establishing trademark infringement.  He jumps 
instead to the most salient (and typical) factors that result in preliminary 
injunctions being issued (pp.187-88).  Interestingly, Lane also notes one 
case where the defendant ignored the preliminary injunction and defaulted 
on appearing to contest the case, resulting in a permanent injunction.  This 
example raises the issue as to whether trademark law is also ineffective in 
stopping infringing sales of mass produced products from foreign 
jurisdictions.  His other litigation example, as it had not concluded, 
similarly fails to provide an adequate assessment of “the actual impact on 
green consumers” (p.191).  In contrast, Lane provides an optimistic 
example of a successful injunction against a false use of a certification mark 
on biodegradable bags and food containers (pp.192-93).  Lane also notes 
concerns about litigation that, because of failure to reject marks for 
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descriptiveness, may preclude other companies from using consumer-
friendly descriptive terms in their marks, as well as litigation that threatens 
the use of common, environmentally friendly symbols (like the apple) 
(pp.194-98).  
Lane’s final set of chapters address:  (1) measures to promote development 
and diffusion of clean tech by sharing and pooling clean-tech patents (such 
as GreenXchange and the Eco-Patent Commons), by providing access to 
green-patent data (such as Europe’s Green Patent Database and the Clean 
Energy Patent Growth Index), and by accelerating green patent applications 
in the UK, Korea, the US, and other countries (pp.200-226); (2) differing 
views within the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) expressed (largely) by developing countries and the UN 
Secretariat on the one hand and developed countries on the other over 
whether the patent system hinders (or helps) clean tech development and 
diffusion, and (ultimately rejected) proposals to weaken patent rights in 
regard to climate change technologies (pp.227-236); and (3) examples of 
significant technology transfer deals (pp.237-48) that “may represent the 
beginning of a major global diffusion and deployment of clean 
technologies” (p.202) and which “recognize that green patents are not a 
problem in addressing climate change, but part of the solution.”  Again, 
Lane’s descriptions are rich, balanced and accurate, and clearly presented, 
and he has fairly presented differing views on the benefits or detriments of 
relying on the patent system to develop and disseminate needed climate 
change mitigation and adaptation technologies. 
Nevertheless, I differ substantively from Lane regarding what appears to be 
his optimistic view of these developments and of the potential for “clean 
tech transfer [to] happen irrespective of IP rights” (p.202), at least to the 
extent that I believe is necessary to adequately address climate change and 
other pressing environmental concerns.  For one thing, he quotes to a study8 
that concludes that patent rights “‘cannot possibly be an obstacle for the 
transfer of climate change technologies’” to the poorest countries because 
they lack patent rights at all (p.248).  But this simply disregards the problem 
that the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”) restricts compulsory 
licensing for export to other countries.9  That restriction, widely recognized 
to prevent low-cost generic production of medicines for transfer to the 
poorest countries, was overridden as a result of international pressures,10 
but only for medicines and not in regard to climate change technologies. 
Nor does the fact that “global deployment of clean technologies is 
happening on an ever-increasing scale” or the existence of major deals 
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between developed countries and business partners “in emerging markets 
such as Brazil, India, and China” (p.249) indicate that IP rights do not 
hinder technology transfer.  We lack any counterfactual world or good 
natural examples to prove these claims or to test the alternatives.  Even 
Lane acknowledges that, given the lack of attractive markets and profits, 
“neither technology sharing mechanisms based on donating or pooling 
patents nor green patent databases are going to spur diffusion of clean 
technologies to the poorest nations” (p.216).  Nor is it clear that rich 
countries will willingly pay the high prices to purchase and transfer 
patented technologies without imposing price constraints through 
compulsory licensing or government procurement or third-party production 
authorizations (or take the other actions purportedly required by their 
international commitments under the UNFCCC and other treaties) to meet 
the rapidly increasing mitigation and adaptation needs.11 
However, I candidly admit that I lack the ability to disprove Lane’s 
optimism.  I agree with Lane’s observation that a comprehensive study to 
determine if IP rights are more of an incentive or an obstacle to technology 
transfer may be impossible and would require “empirical patent data, global 
trade statistics, economic analysis, and scores of interviews with 
representative from clean tech companies” that currently do not exist  
(p.236).  Further, I believe that these disputes reflect common (and highly 
polarized) politico-philosophical differences that ultimately are based on 
fundamental faith in or skepticism towards markets or towards government 
intervention in them.12  So although I beg to differ, I offer this alternative 
perspective not as a criticism of Lane’s optimism but as a caution against 
un-critical acceptance of it.  And we both agree that “[u]ndoubtedly, IP 
rights will continue to be debated as the UNFCCC talks continue in the 
years to come” (p.236). 
Eric Lane has made a very valuable, extremely readable, and thoroughly 
enjoyable contribution to the field of clean technology and intellectual 
property that will help readers who are not already familiar with the topics 
to understand why these issues matter and to get a very good feel for patent 
and trademark issues that are raised.  Lane’s ability to give the reader 
practical insights gained from actual experience is the book’s strength, and 
his clear and accessible discussions make the book very well designed for 
what appears to be his intended audience―business people, the general 
public, and non-IP lawyers who may need to know something about the IP 
law issues.  Given that audience, it would be unfair to criticize him for not 
developing the book further to provide the strategic insights that would 
benefit the IP lawyers who will actually provide their clients with advice.  
But I hope he will do so in some format, and thereby supply what seems 
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most missing from the present book.  To do so will likely require 
developing a treatise rather than a 250-page paperback.  But it should pay 
off even more handsomely both in royalties from grateful IP lawyers and in 
client development opportunities. 
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Why should things be simple?  Or put another way, why should we ignore 
the complexity of things?  Professor Tussey, in her engaging and thought- 
provoking new book, COMPLEX COPYRIGHT: MAPPING THE 
INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM, effectively raises this question about 
copyright.  She argues that copyright policy makers should recognize how 
copyright operates as a complex adaptive system.  As a result, copyright 
law will be more responsive to the needs of creative individuals and the 
promotion of creativity.  She states her objectives clearly in her 
introduction.  “[A]n ideal copyright law would create a self-regulating, 
homeostatic system in which market demand would create a feedback loop 
driving the creation of culture” (p.11).  With that goal in mind, Professor 
Tussey weaves an argument that shows how copyright is akin to a prairie 
ecosystem and how sometimes more flexible copyright law can lead to 
more copyrighted works. 
With all her references to systems, Professor Tussey may be labeled a 
structuralist, someone who thinks that there are hidden structures that define 
social relationships and our understanding of the world.  But she makes 
clear at the start of her argument that her concern is with behavior, not just 
structures.  What makes a system complex is different from what might 
make it simply complicated, with lots of bells and whistles and moving 
parts.  A complicated system is at some level predictable, once the 
connections among the parts are identified.  A complex system, however, 
has a degree of unpredictability as the remotest change might have 
unforeseen consequences.  To manage complex systems, one has to be 
flexible and attuned to behavior.  One has to take a bottom-up approach, 
starting from experience and ending with rules and principles, which in turn 
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shape experiences.  Feedback and learning define complex adaptive 
systems.  They should also define copyright law and policy. 
Professor Tussey makes her case for copyright as a complex adaptive 
system carefully and meticulously.  She starts from examining the 
legislative institutions which give rise to copyright law.  She accurately 
portrays these institutions as a set of competing and deliberating economic 
interests that guide the drafting of laws.  As I read her description, such a 
system is a closed one, seemingly impervious to outside influence, 
particularly that of deeper or long term consequences beyond the narrow 
interests of certain groups.  How to break this closed system of law making?  
Professor Tussey asks lawmakers, presumably with the aid of law 
professors and other advocates, towards a more empirical understanding of 
copyright law.  Like the little boy who points out the emperor’s nakedness, 
we need to confront the empirical reality that more copyright law does not 
necessarily lead to more works or to innovation.  Professor Tussey does a 
nice job in collecting and summarizing the works of several scholars who 
have taken on such an obvious, yet protean, task.  In fact, Professor Tussey 
argues that the scholarly literature supports the proposition that more 
copyright might lead to fewer works.  Empiricism breaks the closed loop of 
copyright law making and adds a point of intervention.  Copyright law must 
be held to the standard of empirically verifiable consequences.  Copyright 
law must interact with the facts to reshape and reform in response to the 
effects on creative output.  This loop is one type of complex adaptive 
system that Professor Tussey seeks to effectuate in her rendering of 
complex copyright. 
Another system is that of creativity itself, which needs to respond to the 
changing environment of technology and social values.  The Internet is the 
most obvious and salient example of the changing environment.  Changing 
norms that push towards group creation or audience participation (and user 
generated content more broadly) are other examples.  Copyright law can be 
a tool to prevent such shifts in creativity.  For example, incumbent 
copyright owners use copyright law to fight technological change, such as 
the VCR, or file sharing, or Internet fora, like YouTube.  These legal battles 
are ones over conflicting business models or ones over how to acquire the 
surplus created by new markets, media, and technologies.  Nonetheless, 
within complex adaptive systems, creative practices and copyright law need 
to adapt to changes in the environment, instead of reacting to preserve 
obsolete forms of creating and distributing information.  A dynamic 
copyright law that learns to adapt would be one that is, as she describes, 
The IP Law Book Review  20 
self-regulating and homeostatic, one that evolves in a self-directed and 
stable manner.  
Professor Tussey does offer some specifics in designing and implementing 
her ideal copyright system.  Drawing on the work of Elinor Ostrom, 
Professor Tussey asks how to more carefully consider the actual design of 
institutions that demonstrate how people actually do manage resources.  A 
clear directive for her book is a more engaged empiricism.  In addition, her 
book asks us to think of the law in dynamic terms, as opposed to a set of 
static rules and doctrines that are tailored to various facts.  Law does not 
simply act on facts, but is shaped by them.  Professor Tussey is urging us to 
move in that direction of thinking as well. 
Professor Tussey gives us much to think about in understanding copyright 
law and policy.  My first thought was to her reference to a copyright 
system.  This reference is to the set of doctrines and policies that describe 
the ecosystem of copyright law.  I wonder if this is the right system with 
which to begin the analysis of complex adaptive systems.  More relevant in 
my opinion is the ecosystem of authors, artists, publishers, distributors, 
readers, consumers, and entrepreneurs that interact in the realm of creation, 
production, and distribution.  The question is how to design a copyright 
regime to effectively and appropriately govern this complex ecosystem.  In 
other words, the law is the means, and not the ends.  The complexity of the 
copyright system is the tail that is wagged by the needs and wants of the 
various constituencies and interests that constitute the creativity ecosystem.  
The distinction I make is a relevant one.  The complexity of copyright law 
may reflect and suit the needs of these constituencies.  But the relevant 
landscape is not the legal one.  While ultimately the copyright system is 
what we must design, we need to understand the complex relationships and 
behavior that copyright law has to serve. 
In thinking of the creativity ecosystem, I was struck by Professor Tussey’s 
reference to “market demand” which she describes as creating a feedback 
loop driving the creation of culture.  If market demand is the keystone for 
copyright, there are two striking problems.  First, why should consumer 
needs be the ones that drive creativity, and not the needs and desires of 
creative people?  Steve Jobs famously stated that he viewed innovators as 
leaders, not followers.  Henry Ford said that if he asked consumers what 
they wanted, they would have asked for a faster horse.  Ford did something 
better.  Analogously, consumers of culture may simply want more action 
movies, more explicit pornography, and more filling beer.  De gustibus non 
disputandum, but at the same time, creative artists more often than not fill a 
need that many consumers never knew they had.  It is not completely clear 
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how non-consumer interests would figure into Professor Tussey’s identified 
ecosystem. 
Even more vexing is the emphasis on market demand.  I assume by her 
reference to a market, Professor Tussey means a price mediated institution 
that allows consumers to express a willingness to pay which serves a signal 
for how creative people should guide their creative energies.  As a matter of 
reality, perhaps market demand is the correct way to frame the problem.  
But Professor Tussey should be more explicit in depicting this market.  Is it 
price-mediated?  Is there a dimension of non-price or quality-based 
competition?  Is it a completely free market or does government regulation 
figure in somehow?  Is there a market for speech and ideas as well as one 
for goods and services? If so, how are all of these to be recognized?  These 
questions are not meant to be pedantic ones.  If the goal is to address the 
ecosystem of creativity and if the market is to somehow figure into that 
ecosystem, then we need some account of what this market looks like and 
how it functions.   
Professor Tussey’s reference to market demand is even more telling in light 
of her appeal to complex adaptive systems.  One example of a complex 
adaptive system is the economic vision of markets.  A general equilibrium 
view of markets is a type of complex system, entailing the interaction of 
many demanders and many suppliers coordinated through the working of 
price mechanisms.  There is no doubt that it is a complex system.  It is also 
one that adapts, and its adaptation can be simulated through changes in the 
economic environment of technologies and preferences.  But it is also a 
description of a complex environment that elevates the values of wealth 
maximization and efficiency over those of distribution and fairness.   
My point is that referring to creativity and copyright as parts of a complex 
adaptive system requires more detail in order to have traction for law and 
policy.  On this point, I think Professor Tussey offers a nice starting point, 
but more work has to be done to flesh out the institutional details of the 
complex system that she imagines.  Despite her appeal to market demand, I 
think she does mean something more than the economic general equilibrium 
model of markets.  New institutional theorists, following from Coase, and 
economic and legal historians of widely diverging stripes (North, Hurst, 
Grief) offer contrasting frameworks for addressing complex systems.  Each 
bases the representation of the complex system on different assumptions 
and empirical understandings.  In subsequent work, it would be interesting 
to see how Professor Tussey fleshes out the complexity of creativity and 
copyright based on her own understandings.  The additional details will 
make her arguments stronger and more convincing. 
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I also wanted to see more discussion of the normative framework for 
assessing copyright law and the complex ecosystems.  Is the concern with 
freedom to create?  Or is there also a concern with the distributional 
consequences of such freedom?  The normative framework can make a 
difference for assessing copyright policy as it shapes the ecosystem of 
creativity.  The normative framework would also affect how we understand 
the big question raised by Professor Tussey’s book.  Even if an ecosystem is 
a complex one, does the law that governs  a complex ecosystem also have to 
be complex?  The copyright system may rest on simple principles that can 
effectively guide an adaptive creativity ecosystem.  How about a rule like: 
transformative authors always win?  Such a rule would support the creator 
of a movie against an unauthorized copier of a DVD.  Such a rule would 
support the unauthorized creator of a funny YouTube parody against the 
author of the source work.  I am not advocating such a rule, but I could see 
how such a simple rule could have traction in organizing and governing the 
complex ecosystem of creativity.  I did not get a sense from Professor 
Tussey’s book on how to choose among different institutional arrangements 
for copyright.  If the sole criterion is one of creativity and the generation of 
more works, then simple rules like that one I propose would be quite 
appropriate.   
In conclusion, Professor Tussey has written a thought-provoking book and 
is in good company with many recent books that address intellectual 
property reform.  I recommend reading and thinking about her arguments, 
and I look forward to see how she builds on her important and provocative 
ideas. 
 
© 2012 Shubha Ghosh  
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IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA heralds a new generation of 
English monographs that examines the Chinese intellectual property regime 
for its own sake.  Yahong Li delves into the challenges of innovation and 
patent protection in China’s rapidly evolving biotechnology sector, and 
those who join her foray are rewarded with a new appreciation of how the 
patent system relates to its traditional promise of spurring innovation.  Her 
study of China’s patent system avoids the narratives of counterfeit and 
piracy that came to dominate so much of the writing on Chinese IP 
protection in the last decade.   
This reorientation could not have come too soon.  Even as of 2011, the 
Chinese IP headlines that captured public attention worldwide were the case 
of the fake Apple Store in the city of Kunming and the alleged 
misappropriation of high speed rail technology by the Chinese government.  
To the extent that China’s IP developments are recognized in the legal 
literature, they are tempered with anxieties about “indigenous innovation” 
and “junk patents”, both negatively connoted.  The emphasis is distinctly 
exogenous and mercantilist—China’s IP practices are only interesting, it 
would seem, to the extent that they are shown to have effects on the West 
and vice versa.  Li’s study is refreshing because it examines patent law in 
light of its original function of promoting domestic welfare. 
It is precisely in her frank and relentless investigation of the link between 
Chinese patent and pharmaceutical innovation that the book finds resonance 
outside the immediate circle of Chinese IP scholarship.  Stripped to its core, 
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her subject is the relationship between patents and innovation—the 
perennial debate at the center of the patent field.  Those who have read 
Christine MacLeod’s analysis of the English patent system during the 
industrial revolution know that in order to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of ones’ own system, it is sometimes necessary to observe its 
operation from the outside and subject it to conditions far from one’s own.1
This time Li takes us to China, and with higher stakes:  her subject is the 
present, and her audience includes policymakers and entrepreneurs who are 
in a position to influence economic development and medical welfare in the 
most populous country in the world.  
Chapter one situates the readers in the current split in the literature 
regarding the role of patents vis-à-vis innovation in developing countries; 
that is, do patents help or hurt development?  (pp.14-16).  Chapter two 
surveys a dense array of statistics characterizing the growth of China’s 
biotech and pharmaceutical sector, and chapter three enlists detailed case 
studies showcasing the variation of R&D capacity, collaboration models, 
and government support across technology subfields.  Together, these two 
descriptive chapters introduce the state of the Chinese biotech and 
pharmaceutical sector at the start of the century: China is strong in 
genomics, transgenic organisms, cloning, and biopharmaceuticals but 
weaker in chemical drug discovery and stem cell research (pp.30-38); a 
great majority of the support comes from the government, alongside foreign 
investments and collaborators drawn by China’s market, low cost, talent 
pool, and R&D infrastructure (pp.42-43).   
Chapter four begins the theoretical inquiry with a study of China’s R&D 
models, which Li divides into four categories from the least to the most 
innovative:  imitation, “me-too” innovation, “me-better” innovation and 
“me-first” innovation (pp.52-59).  For the first category, studies of 
pervasive copying are duly cited:  97% of synthetic drugs are copies of 
others products, 99% of all companies involved in anti-cancer drugs 
produce imitation drugs, generics make up 90% of the biologics drug 
market (pp.52-53).  But on balance, pure copying is no longer a viable 
business model due to low prices, fierce competition, infringement risk and 
diminishing returns on further copying since “there are not many new drugs 
left to be imitated” (p.53).  Meanwhile, breakthrough innovations are 
“practically impossible” for China’s current scientific and financial strength 
(p.65).   The only path left open, she reluctantly acknowledges, is that of 
incremental innovation based on variations of the existing state of the art, 
which in turn depends on “sophisticated legal and technical expertise to find 
the patent loopholes of pioneer inventions ...” (p.65).  Chapter five 
examines biotech and pharmaceutical patenting trends and further reveals 
that the better IP assets and stronger patents are still in the hands of 
multinational corporations, despite increasing patent filings from domestic 
companies, which in turn leads to increasing patent litigation.   
So how should China formulate its patent system to enable an incremental 
innovation strategy when the sector is dominated by the IP of multinational 
pharmaceutical corporations?  To answer this question, Li examines 
Chinese patent law as it applies to this sector.  She addresses issues of 
patentable subject matter (Chapter 6), conditions of patentability (Chapter 7) 
and the treatment of patent rights (Chapter 8).  The Chinese government 
appears to have responded to foreign patents by trimming back protection in 
the latest round of patent amendments in 2008 (p.169).  Li instead 
prescribes a stronger patent system and more patenting as the solution 
(pp.157, 161).  This central policy claim is based on the balance of the 
patent’s dynamic incentives versus the static welfare loss particular to 
China.   
On the positive side, Li observes substantial prospect interest and signaling 
effects at work: 
…Patents do promote innovation in the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries to the extent that they boost 
incentives for investment from domestic private sector and 
foreign investors, foster an innovative spirit and culture 
among research institutions, and help to identify national 
strategic areas for S&T development (p.157).   
On the issue of the welfare loss due to a possible patent thicket or limited 
medical access, she finds the effect less serious than some have assumed.  
To the former, she notes that “the obstacle for technology access was not 
caused mainly by patents but rather by the MPC patent holders, who 
account for about a third of total patent holders in China” (p.177).  This 
obstacle is surmountable because historically MPCs have not obtained 
extensive patent coverage and now face successful patent challenges.  For 
example, out of eleven Chinese patent applications that were filed for the 
transgenic “Golden Rice”, only two were granted, and even those two were 
ultimately invalidated (p.170).  Moreover, the industry has a successful 
track record of licensing or inventing around patented technology and 
Chinese companies can reverse their fortunes by patenting more innovations 
of their own.  On the balance, it is better to maintain strong incentives to 
promote innovation and let time fix the uneven distribution of patents than 
to reduce the desire for innovation overall.  As for public medical welfare, 
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she ascribes access problems to the profit motives of hospitals and generics 
companies themselves rather than to patent exclusivity (p.171).   
Scholars of Chinese IP law or technology development will benefit from 
Li’s extensive collection of references and the synthesis of Chinese 
language materials.  These, especially the analysis of legal disputes and 
government support programs, are rarely in one place and accessible to the 
English-speaking community, although the majority of the data and cited 
studies predate 2008 and reflect a historical snapshot from half a decade 
prior.  For example, the study reports that only 15.4 percent of domestic 
patents were granted for inventions as opposed to utility models or 
industrial designs in 2008 (p.70).  The latest figure from SIPO for 2011 
suggests the mix of invention patents has increased to 25.4% a mere three 
years later, which appears to confirm Li’s endorsement of China’s technical 
capacity.2  To be sure, all studies have to cut off at some point, and these 
historical figures represent a testament to the rapid changes going on in 
China.  They also provide a baseline matrix for future comparisons. 
Those interested in broader IP and development issues will relate to “the 
context of China’s transitional economy and its place as the world’s largest 
developing country with a relatively high technological capacity” (p.157) 
but “low capacity in commercialization” (p.161) and draw immediate 
comparisons to the other BRIC countries facing a similar confluence of 
foreign patent ownership and domestic needs.  Li’s approval of a strong 
patent regime seems to contradict the path taken by other developing 
countries such as India, Brazil and Thailand, but China is simply at a 
different point along the trajectory of economic transformation.  Whether 
one agrees with Li’s ultimate conclusion that China is ready for a strong 
patent system, policymakers can look to the technological conditions 
examined in this study to evaluate when and whether a national patent 
system should switch from low protection to higher protection.   
Developed countries boasting a higher level of innovative capacity may also 
take heed, notwithstanding Li’s prescription targeting “incremental 
innovation”.  The division of innovative capacity into pure imitation, “me- 
too” imitation, “me-better” and pure imitation may be more suited to 
catalogue inventiveness ex post rather than serving as ex ante policy 
guideposts.  It can provide a useful descriptive framework to consider the 
effects of patent law on countries at varying stages of development.  But 
attention to detail is crucial to the categorization project:  to illustrate the 
concept of “me-too” innovation, for example, Li cited Cialis and Levitra as 
analogues of Viagra, even though these chemical analogues are new 
chemical entities with improved therapeutic profiles and developed by 
The IP Law Book Review  27 
The IP Law Book Review  28 
                                                           
recognized innovators like Bayer (p.54).  Li also includes in the example of 
incremental innovation three Chinese-developed cancer treatment products, 
Gendicine, Oncorine, and Endostar, which are no less than the first, second, 
and third commercially available gene therapy products anywhere in the 
world (pp.34, 55).  If all that Chinese firms can manage are incremental 
innovations of such caliber, they would have done very well in terms of 
profitability, patient welfare, and contribution to the store of knowledge.  It 
is unclear that we would want to provide less of a reward to beneficial 
improvements merely because they are incremental, nor should we presume 
to know what policy choice promotes disruptive technology over 
incremental improvements.  Thus, Li’s advice for China is equally relevant 
to countries that have embraced a notion of innovation broader than a “flash 
of creative genius”.3 
IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA is an endorsement of the 
patent system based on a look from the inside, making it far more credible 
than a call for higher IP protection during bilateral trade talks.  However, 
the endorsement is clearly situational: the perceived benefits are reserved 
for those countries having significant technical capacity but relatively fewer 
blocking patent rights.  The ironic lesson of the China case is that the 
benefits of a stronger patent system may depend on a prior period of lesser 
protection.  Interestingly, this suggests that perhaps there is no optimal 
national patent system but only an optimal cycle of patent systems that 
waxes and wanes in counter step to the level of patenting. 
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